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Chapter 1
Introduction
Innovation provides the world with new technologies and has been shown to
be a necessary process for sustainable economic growth. Many economists
believe innovation is an economic rather than a scientic phenomenon, and
so can be aected by some economic policies. In the early 1990s, the basic
analytical frameworks were constructed by Romer (1990), Grossman and
Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992), and many other economists.
In all these models, the engine of permanent growth is research and devel-
opment (R&D) by private innovators, which is determined endogenously.
By extending these frameworks, other studies have examined which policies
can increase an R&D eort, thereby enhancing the economic growth rate.
A new technology is a collection of knowledge that has the characteristics
of a public good (i.e., it is non-excludable and non-rivalrous). If there is
no mechanism to prevent intellectual property knowledge from spreading,
the innovator cannot appropriate the benets stemming from the invention,
and his/her payo will be lower. As long as innovation is an economic
activity that aims to earn revenue, having this sort of limited incentive
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leads to less innovation. This conventional wisdom naturally suggests the
need for policies that regulate knowledge spillover and secure the rights of
appropriation. As a result, many studies focus on how regulatory policies
can stimulate incentives for inventors, thereby encouraging innovation.
Global common policies on protecting intellectual property rights (IPR)
have also been the topic of discussion at recent international conferences.
In 1994, all WTO members signed an agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), which reinforces the protection
of intellectual property rights. More recently, many countries in the Pacic
Ocean area negotiated the Trans-Pacic Partnership (TPP) agreement. The
TPP requires that member countries extend patent terms beyond the 20-
year minimum prescribed by the TRIPs agreement.
However, strengthening the protection of intellectual property rights on
its own is not enough to regulate free rides on new knowledge in some envi-
ronments. How to actually enforce the law is another important issue. For
example, in some developing countries, many entrepreneurs produce illegal
imitations that infringe the intellectual property rights of rms in developed
countries. The Chinese government has intensied its seizure of illegal im-
itations, but the problem remains, resulting in enormous losses for foreign
rms.
The traditional view held by economists is that innovation only occurs in
developed countries, which tend to have technological advantages over other
countries. However, recent studies have shown that the amount of R&D
investment in developing countries has increased, and that their innovative
activities can no longer be ignored. This shift in balance has created new
friction between developed countries and developing countries.
Based on recent changes in global circumstances, this dissertation dis-
cusses how regulatory policies aect economic performance. In particular, I
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focus on the impact of such policies on innovation and economic growth.
Can strong IPR protection policies enhance economic growth? In chap-
ter 2, I discuss this question with the aid of an endogenous growth model
in which \trade secret" is introduced as an additional protection method.
Menell and Scotchmer (2007) pointed out that the landscape of intellectual
property comprises a variegated array of distinct legal regimes: patent, trade
secret, trademark, copyright, mask work protection, and so on. The model
in chapter 2 focuses on the roles of patent protection and trade secret. In
the model, innovators choose a level of protection using these two options.
However, owing to the imperfect nature of these protection mechanisms, the
technological information still diuses across to other rms, helping them
to imitate the technology and further innovate. The chapter shows that
stronger patent protection may actually hinder growth, and that the pat-
terns depend on the leakage risk of trade secrets. In particular, there is a
U-shaped relationship between growth and the strength of patent protection
in the case of a middle-level leakage risk. In contrast, the model shows that
there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between growth and the leakage
risk.
How can legally enforcing IPR against infringement aect innovation and
imitation? Unlike chapter 2, chapter 3 focuses on the role of enforcement
after illegal imitation occurs, rather than the strength of IPR protection. In
particular, the chapter studies the eect of seizing illegal imitations within
developing countries, as well as prohibitions on importing these items from
developing countries. This chapter has three main results. First, a higher
seizure rate does not always decrease imitative activity in South. Thesere-
peat oenses are an observed feature of developing countries. Second, the
model shows a U-shaped relationship between innovation and the seizure
rate. Third, a prohibition on importing Southern illegal imitations neces-
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sarily lowers imitative activities.
What is the nature of the relationship between foreign direct investment
(FDI) and innovative activities in developing countries? Recent empirical
studies show that R&D eorts in developing countries have increased. In
chapter 4, I explain a general equilibrium model I have developed of endoge-
nous innovation in both North and South. In contrast to normal North-
South models, I consider a situation in which international trade does not
occur because of the dierence in the country's particular factor. By con-
sidering these two segmented markets, the model shows that Southern R&D
investment is crowded out by FDI because of the market stealing eect.
This eect has been observed empirically, but is either not considered or
underestimated by existing theoretical models.
Finally, chapter 5 concludes this doctoral dissertation.
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Chapter 2
Patent Policy and Trade
Secret
2.1 Introduction
In the traditional view, strong intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection
enhances economic growth because it secures innovator's prots and provides
inventors with incentives to innovate. Although there is a trade-o between
monopolistic distortion and economic growth (e.g., Nordhaus 1969), static
distortion has been regarded as a necessary evil for dynamic gain. In the
recent decades, enhancing IPR protection has been promoted largely by the
OECD countries, especially after 1994, when the TRIPS Agreement was
implemented.1
1Park (2008) created an index that represents the level of patent protection. The index
is composed of ve scores, some of which are duration of protection, patentable coverage,
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However, empirical studies do not necessarily show a positive relationship
between economic growth and the strength of IPR protection.2 For example,
Falvey et al. (2006) showed that the eect of IPR on growth is positive in
low- and high-income countries but not positive in middle-income countries.
Chen and Puttitanun (2005) estimated the eect of IPR on GDP per capita
in developing countries and showed a U-shaped relationship between them.
Similarly, Horii and Iwaisako (2007) also pointed to the ambiguous rela-
tionship between the level of patent protection and the average per capita
growth rate. In addition, some empirical studies show that stronger IPRs
have a non-monotonic eect on R&D. For example, Allred and Park (2007)
nd a U-shaped relationship between rm-level R&D and the strength of
patent rights in developed countries.
A patent holder can transmit private information to competitors even
before the patent expires.3 While the patent system is meant to protect the
properties, during the patent prosecution process, applicants for a patent
must disclose some technological information to the public in return to re-
ceive protection. When the patent system requires a high degree of disclo-
sure in the application, the disclosed information gives competitors clues
that help them catch up and even innovate further. This disclosure actually
causes some rms to avoid patenting their innovation. Cohen et al. (2002)
reported that 46% of Japanese rms report \over disclosure" as the most
important reason for not applying for a patent. In this chapter, I dened
and enforcement mechanisms. Using this index, he showed that the strength of patent
protection has increased over time globally.
2At this point, we may need to pay attention to time lag as one reason. Generally
speaking, R&D projects take time to complete, especially for commercialization; therefore,
the growth eect may not appear immediately after the policy change.
3For example, the detail of the technological information of numerous patent applica-
tions can be accessed freely on the Internet. The amount of access to the website of the
Japan Patent Oce (JPO) from China is very large, and experts note that the website is
used for imitative activities in China.
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the level of disclosure requirement in patent application as the strength of
patent protection.
Trade secrets have an advantage over patents in that they do not disclose
any information to competitors unless the secrets are leaked. In a question-
naire by Cohen et al. (2002), most U.S. rms respond that trade secrets are
more eective than patents for appropriating benet from innovation.4 In
addition, Cohen et al. (2000, p. 7) state that\Dierent mechanisms may
even be employed at the same time for a given innovation when an innova-
tion is composed of separately protectable components or features." Thus, to
study IPR policies more realistically, we need to focus on the role of trade
secrets as an alternative protection.
The model considers an economy in which innovators develop a good that
contains many fractional parts. A successful innovator decides how many
parts of the good are to be protected by patent, and the rest are main-
tained as trade secrets. Patents ensure a stable prot in the long run, but
the period prot is relatively low because the patents disclose technological
information to competitors. On the other hand, by keeping the informa-
tion a secret, the patent holder can earn high period prot in the short
run. However, if the secret leaks out to competitors, prots will drastically
decrease because the innovation has not been patented. Some studies in in-
dustrial organization address the decision of whether to patent.5 However,
in DGE modeling, there are few studies in which two IPR protections and
4Especially in the process innovation, both U.S. and Japanese rms depend on trade
secrets rather than other protection methods.
5Anton and Yao (2004) established a model in which an innovator discretely decides
whether to protect his innovation by patent or as a trade secret, as well as what aspects
of the invention are the innovator wishes to disclose. Similarly, Ottoz and Cugno (2008)
constructed a model in which an innovator can protect the innovation by a patent-secret
mix. These studies focus on how innovation size and strength of protection change a
rm's protection strategy, and do not include an analysis of how such a change aects the
economy.
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the patenting behavior are explicitly introduced.
This chapter investigates the growth eect of disclosure necessary for
patent protection. In the model, disclosed information becomes the common
knowledge and other rms can use it for the partial imitation and further
innovation. Lowering disclosure requirement decreases the amount of the
common knowledge, which has two opposite eects on economic growth.
First, the reduction of the common knowledge increases prot because the
productivity of competitive fringes becomes low. This prot increase nat-
urally stimulates the incentives for innovation. However, because potential
innovators cannot access much of the information, it increases their R&D
costs and discourages innovation in the long run. When the leakage risk
is suciently low, the former positive eect dominates the latter negative
eect. As a result, lowering the disclosure requirement may accelerate eco-
nomic growth. Interestingly, in the case of middle leakage risk, the rela-
tionship between the required disclosure level in the patent application and
economic growth exhibits a U-shaped curve.
Although most studies have concentrated on analyzing the optimal patent
policy, they have not yet reached a consensus on the optimal strength
of IPR protection. In the context of industrial organization, Gilbert and
Shapiro (1990) conclude that a patent system with innite length and nar-
row breadth is desirable. On the other hand, Klemperer (1990) shows that
a patent design with either very long or very short length is optimal. In
DGE modeling, the pioneering work by Judd (1985) demonstrates that the
optimal length of patent protection is innite. However, Horowitz and Lai
(1996) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2007) deem nite length to be optimal.
In addition, there are few studies in which trade secret is explicitly intro-
duced. Some studies do not specify the protection method by treating the
probability that costless imitation occurs as a level of IPR protection. In
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such a context, Horii and Iwaisako (2007) obtained an inverted U-shaped re-
lationship between IPR protection level and growth rate. This specication
is feasible for simplication and contributes to an analysis of the abstract
eects of IPR protection. However, the result of such studies may be too
generic to be employed as an actual IPR policy.
The main dierence between the current study and the aforementioned
literature is that I explicitly consider both IPR protection and endogenous
\mixed protection" in the model. By studying this realistic situation, we
can obtain a new implication of IPR protection and the role of information
disclosure.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 briey in-
troduces the role of patents and trade secrets in the model. Section 2.3
develops an endogenous growth model that incorporates two IPR protec-
tions. We obtain the growth eect of two IPR protections numerically in
section 2.4. Finally, section 2.5 concludes the chapter.
2.2 Basic Setup of Patent and Trade Secret
First, this section briey shows the role of two IPR protections by calculating
the rm's prot. Suppose that there is only one good that comprises many
fractional parts, and the good is produced by a monopolist. Let  2 [0; 1]
denote the percentage of \patented parts" in the good. Then, 1  indicates
the portion of \secret parts." Although  is exogenous here, we will derive
it endogenously in the next section. For simplicity, I assume that the patent
protection goes forever unless the rm pays the patent maintenance fee.
Patents are an imperfect form of protection because the rms must dis-
close the technological information of the innovation when they apply for
the patent. Furthermore, this process enables imitators to access the infor-
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Figure 2.1: The transition of protected parts of the innovation. The protected
parts in each stage are represented by the shaded area. The left panel depicts the
stage before the trade secrets are leaked out (stage-1), and the right panel shows
the stage after leakage (stage-2).
mation about the product's composition or the production method. I simply
assume that a fraction of  2 [0; 1] in the patented parts becomes common
knowledge and that other rms can use the information without infringing
the patent. We can regard  as the requirement level of the patent disclo-
sure in the patent application or the level of openness of the patent system.
Therefore, a large  indicates weak protection.
Similarly, the trade secret approach does not oer perfect protection
because the secret leaks out with a probability of `. The rms can keep
the trade secret as private information at rst, but once the leakage occurs,
all the secret parts of the good are disclosed. For convenience, we call the
situation before (after) the leakage \stage-1 (stage-2)."
Fig 2.1 shows how the two ways of protection individually classify the
innovation into protected parts and disclosed parts for each stage. The
innovation is divided into patented parts  (left side) and secret parts 1 
(right side). In stage-1, the secret parts are perfectly protected, but the
patented parts are partially protected due to the information disclosure by
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patent application. Thereby, the patented parts are bisected into protected
parts and disclosed parts, as shown in the left panel of Fig 2.1. As a result,
the protected parts of the innovation in stage-1 are all secret parts and
partial patented parts. In stage-2, all the secret parts are disclosed and the
protected parts are only the partial patented area, as depicted in the right
panel of Fig 2.1.
I dene dn() as the percentage of unprotected parts of the good in stage
n = 1; 2. From Fig 2.1, dn() is evaluated as follows.
d1() = ; (2.1)
d2() = 1  (1  ): (2.2)
The monopolist has a technological advantage against the imitators ac-
cording to the amount of protected information. He can produce one good
by employing one worker. On the other hand, imitators can produce n  1
units of the same good with one unit of labor.6 I assume that n depends
on dn and specify n as following the function of .
n() = 
 1 + (1   1)dn(); n = 1; 2: (2.3)
 1 is the minimum value of n, which is attained when no information is
disclosed (dn = 0). We can check 1() = 1 when dn() = 1 and 1() =
 1 when dn() = 0 hold.7 Because imitators can use additional information
(1 ) after the leakage, the amount of information disclosure in both stages
6We can also interpret n as the cost disadvantage for imitators. When n is very small,
imitators must input a large number of workers for production. In contrast, imitators can
perfectly copy in the case of n = 1.
7The case of  = 0 and  = 1 corresponds to Grossman and Helpman's model in which
the technological advantage of the monopolist is  1.
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may be dierent (d1  d2). For this reason, 1()  2() holds, which
implies the advantage in stage-1 is larger than 1 in stage-2 when  < 1.
In the market, the monopolist and the imitators are engaged in Bertrand
competition and the monopolist employs the limit-pricing strategy. The
unit production cost of the imitator in stage-n is  1n w, and the unit cost of
monopolists is w. Therefore, the monopolist can exclude the imitators from
the market with a price p =  1n w.
To derive the prot of the monopolist, I assume that the demand function
is an inverse of the price, x(t) = 1=p(t), and the total consumer expenditure
equals 1.8 Then, the monopolist's prot is
n = p  x  w  x
= 1  w  n
w
= (1   1)(1  dn):
Finally, we can calculate n in each stage as follows:
1() =
 
1   1 (1  ) and (2.4)
2() =
 
1   1 (1  ): (2.5)
Fig 2.2 shows the prot curve for each stage. n is the linear function of
 and satises 1(1) = 0(1) and 2(0) = 0. The upper downward-sloping
straight line represents the prot for stage-1 and the lower upward-sloping
straight line is the prot for stage-2.
Here, there is a trade-o between 1 and 2. To see this briey, consider
the case that the innovator protects a small fraction of the innovation by
8In the full model, I will show that the assumption is endogenously obtained in the
equilibrium. Here, we take the results in advance.
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Figure 2.2: Patented fraction and the prot in each stage.
patent (L). Then, he can earn a relatively high prot before leakage (
L
1 )
because most of the technological information is concealed from other rms.
However, after the leakage occurs, he obtains a low prot (L2 ) because the
patented parts that still remain are relatively small. Next, we consider the
case where the innovator patents a large fraction of the innovation (H).
Because the technological information about the patented parts is partially
disclosed to other rms, he earns a relatively small prot in stage-1 (H1 ).
After the leakage, however, the reduction size of the prot is relatively small
because the innovator does not overly depend on maintaining the trade
secret. Therefore, he can still earn a relatively high prot in stage-2 (H2 ).
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2.3 The Rest of the Model
The model is an extension of Grossman and Helpman (1991), which is a
quality-ladder model. There is a continuum of the sector indexed by j 2 [0; 1]
and a monopolist in each sector. The monopolist can earn prot until a
potential rm succeeds in an innovation in that sector. Because the quality
of a new product is higher than the previous one, the incumbent is replaced
by the new innovator. For a more detailed description of the model, see
Grossman and Helpman (1991).
2.3.1 Households
The economy consists of L identical households and there is no population
growth. Each household serves a unit of labor inelastically and gains a wage
w in every period. They maximize intertemporal utility over an innite
horizon as follows:
Ut =
Z 1
t
e ( t) lnC()d; (2.6)
where  is the subjective discount rate, and C() is an index of consumption
at time  . The instantaneous utility is given by
lnC() =
Z 
0
ln
 
~miX
m=0
m(i)xmt(i)
!
di+
Z 1

ln
0@ ~mjX
m=0
m(j)xmt(j)
1A dj;
(2.7)
where xmt(i) is the consumption of the good whose quality is m in industry
i at time t, and  is the number of the industries from whom the monopolist
has shielded the trade secret (the situation in stage-1). For convenience, we
call such industries \sector-1". Then, 1   is the number of the industries
to whom the monopolist's trade secret has been disclosed; we call these
industries \sector-2".
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The quality of each good is represented as an integer m power of  > 1,
which means that the quality of the new good is  times as high as the
previous one. In industry i, there are ~mi types of goods, and the quality of
the latest good is  ~mi . In the equilibrium, households buy only the good of
the highest quality in each sector because of limit-pricing.
Under the logarithmic utility function, households equally spend their
budget across the industries. Therefore, the demand of a good in the indus-
try i is x ~mi(t) = E=p ~mi(t), where E is expenditure and p ~mi is the price of
the good whose quality is ~mi.
In this setting, the ideal price index associated with the consumption
index C is
P = exp
Z 
0
ln
p ~mi
 ~mi

di+
Z 1

ln
p ~mj
 ~mj

dj

: (2.8)
Given the aggregate price index, households spend to maximize their in-
tertemporal utility. From the result of the maximization, household's opti-
mal time path of spending is represented by _E=E = r . By using aggregate
expenditure as the numeraire according to Grossman and Helpman (1991),
we get E = 1 and r = .
2.3.2 Firms
The time schedule in an industry is as follows. At rst, a successful innovator
chooses optimal mixed protection between patent and trade secret. Then,
he produces goods and earns prot in stage-1 until innovation occurs in
the industry with a probability of z1. In addition, the secret parts of the
innovation leak out with a constant probability ` in stage-1. After that, the
incumbent moves to stage-2 and his prot decreases due to the information
disclosure of the secret parts. Furthermore, once another rm succeeds in
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its R&D with an innovation rate z2, it replaces the incumbent and emerges
as the new incumbent.
I assume that the patent cost is a maintenance fee for simplicity and that
the incumbents must pay c() = 2=2 in every period, where  > 0.9 To
analyze the role of trade secret, I assume that  is not so small and therefore
the optimal  is less than 1 in the equilibrium. Their period payo is the
prot obtained in section 2.2 minus the patent cost. An incumbent decides 
for maximizing the value of innovation V1, dened as a total expected payo
after the innovation occurs. First, we calculate V2, which is the expected
sum of the payo after the trade secret leakage.
V2 =
Z 1
t
e (r+z2)s [2()  c()] ds:
=
2()  c()
r + z2
: (2.9)
Then, from a no-arbitrage condition, V1 is derived as follows:
rV1 = 1(
)  c() + ` (V2   V1)  z1V1
, V1 = 1(
)  c() + ` [2()  c()] =(r + z2)
r + `+ z1
: (2.10)
Each incumbent chooses his  to maximize V1 with a given z. From the
9While the specication of convex patent cost enables us to obtain an interior solution,
most fees (e.g., ling fees) may be proportional to the number of patents. However, the
patent cost in the model includes not only application cost but also other costs. For
example, to be granted a patent of an invention of which it is dicult to determine the
non-obvious aspects (e.g., Program code), innovators need to pay additional costs for
the patent-issuing. Suppose a good comprises many parts and each part has a peculiar
diculty in being granted the patent. At rst, innovators will apply rst for patents of the
easiest parts, but eventually they will be required to pay additional costs to le subsequent
patents.
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rst-order condition, we obtain an optimal  as follows:
(z2) =
8>><>>:
 1
 
1   1  `r+`+z2    when z2 < `=   r   `
0 when z2  `=   r   `:
(2.11)
2.3.3 R&D sector
In the economy, all innovations stem from the R&D activities by potential
rms.10 The preceding R&D cost is covered by issuing equities whose value
is equal to V1.
The blueprints are invented according to the Poisson process so that the
success probability in any time interval dt is zndt = [LRn=An()]dt, where
LR is the number of researchers, n=An() indicates the R&D productivity,
1 = , and 2 = 1   . I assume that R&D becomes more ecient
when the number of targeted sectors n is higher.
11 In addition, in this
model, potential rms can obtain some clues for further innovation from the
disclosed information. I specify An(), which indicates R&D ineciency, as
the following decreasing function of dn.
An() = A  dn; (2.12)
where A is a positive parameter.
10This is called \allow eect" or \replacement eect." All incumbents in sector-1 have
no incentive to innovate by paying some cost because they cannot increase their prot
through the new innovation. The monopolists in sector-2 can raise their prot by successful
innovation, although the incentive to innovate is lower than the incentive of the potential
rms because they have zero-prot now and because the R&D technology is a constant
return here. Therefore, all researchers are employed in the potential rms.
11This spillover can be interpreted as follows. Each industry potentially has a dierent
R&D diculty and potential rms may nd it easy to discover a suitable industry in which
to innovate when the number of the \target" is large.
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2.3.4 Free Entry
A successful innovator earns expected payo V1. On the other hand, the in-
novator must pay R&D cost wAn()=n for innovation in sector-n. There-
fore, free entry into R&D in each sector requires that
w
A1()

 V1; equality holds whenever z1 > 0: (2.13)
w
A2()
1    V1; equality holds whenever z2 > 0: (2.14)
2.3.5 Labor Market
In the economy, the labor supply L is allocated between production and
R&D; therefore, the labor market clearing condition is
L = 
1()
w
+ (1  )2()
w
+A1()  z1 +A2()  z2: (2.15)
2.3.6 Equilibrium
At rst, we derive the condition that the fractions of sector-1 and sector-2
are constant over time. A monopolist in sector-1 moves into sector-2 with a
constant probability `. On the other hand, a rm in sector-2 is replaced by
a new incumbent in sector-1 with a probability z2. Then, the instantaneous
change of  is presented as _ = (1 )z2 `. Therefore, in the steady state,
the following equation holds:
 =
z2
z2 + `
: (2.16)
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There are two types of equilibrium in the model.12 The rst case is
that all R&D concentrate in sector-2, z1 = 0 and z2 > 0. Recall that
A1  A2 necessarily holds. If the initial number of sector-2 is suciently
large, potential rms target only the industries in sector-2 because the R&D
productivity is high. Although larger z2 decreases the (1 ), the equilibrium
of this case becomes stable when ` is suciently large. In this case, next
equation holds in the equilibrium:
A1

>
A2
1   : (2.17)
The second case is that innovation simultaneously occurs in two sectors,
z1 > 0 and z2 > 0. In this case, the R&D productivity across the sector is
the same, and innovators are indierent with regard to the sector. Therefore,
the next equation holds:
A1

=
A2
1   : (2.18)
Once the long-run equilibrium is determined, we can calculate the growth
rate of the consumption index C as below:
g = [z1 + (1  )z2] ln: (2.19)
2.4 Simulation
This section examines the growth eect of the disclosure requirement of the
patent system. To discuss the eect, I numerically calculate the relationship
between  and the growth rate under dierent `.
12The model does not have third case in which z1 > 0 and z2 = 0 are satised. In this
case, A1= < A2=(1 ) initially holds. However, some industries in sector-1 continuously
move to sector-2 due to information leakage, and  gradually decreases until A1= =
A2=(1  ) holds.
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Figure 2.3: Growth rate and the openness of the patent system (). The
upper curve \L" corresponds to the case of ` = 0:35. The middle curve
\M" is the case of ` = 0:45. The lower curve \H" is the case of ` = 0:8.
These graphs indicate that the growth eect is ambiguous and depends on
the leakage probability.
2.4.1 First case: z1 = 0 and z2 > 0
The simulation uses the following parameters: L = 4,  = 1:2,  = 0:03,
A = 2, and  = 1=4. For a sample of the leakage probability, the simulation
uses ` = 0:35, ` = 0:45, ` = 0:8.
Fig 2.3 shows three dierent patterns of the growth eect. In Case L
(` = 0:35), weak patent protection (higher ) enhances growth. In contrast,
in Case H (` = 0:8), larger  has a negative impact on growth in an opposite
direction. In Case M (` = 0:45), the relationship exhibits U-shape and the
growth eect depends on the initial .
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Figure 2.4: Other variables and the openness of the patent system ().
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Figure 2.5: Firm value and the openness of the patent system ().
Interpretation
The inuence on g due to the weakening patent policy ( ") can be decom-
posed into the eects on (1  ) and z2. However, as shown in Panel (a) of
Fig 2.4, the relationship between innovation rate z2 and  determines the
growth eect shown in Fig 2.3. Therefore, to interpret the result, we only
have to focus on the impact of  on z2.
Suppose that the government adapts a stronger patent policy ( #). This
policy has two opposite eects on the incentive of innovators. First, strong
patent protection increases the rm value (V1), as shown in Fig 2.5. When
 is low, competitive fringes have only little information of the inventions
and then the cost advantage of the monopolists becomes high. Panel (f)
of Fig 2.4 indicates that small  necessarily decreases the productivity of
competitive fringes in sector-2. Then, monopolists earn high prot because
they can charge a high price. This eect on V1 will stimulate the incentive of
innovation. However, the second eect has a negative impact on innovation.
When potential rms obtain only little information, the R&D ineciency
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goes up as depicted in Panel (c) of Fig 2.4. As a result, the entire impact
on innovation is determined by these opposite eects. For convenience,
I call these \cost advantage eect" and \R&D ineciency eect",
respectively.
In Case H, the lowering disclosure in patent system ( #) has a positive
eect on the growth rate. In this case, the cost advantage eect is relatively
strong and dominates the R&D ineciency eect. When ` is high, incum-
bents protect many parts of the invention by patent because trade secret
is a relatively weak protection strategy. Then, the incumbent can conceal
a great deal of information involved with the invention when the govern-
ment decreases the disclosure requirement. This means the rm value is
drastically increased by lowering , as shown in Fig 2.5.
In Case L, as illustrated in Fig 2.4, the lowering disclosure in patent
system ( #) has a negative eect on the innovation rate. In this case, con-
versely, Panels (e) and (f) of Fig 2.4 show that small  does not increase the
monopolist's cost advantage a great deal. When ` is relatively low, inno-
vators protect many parts of the inventions by trade secret. Therefore, the
additional amount of the protected parts by strengthening patent protection
( #) is limited. Fig 2.6 briey illustrates this mechanism.
In Case M, the policy has an ambiguous impact on the innovation rate.
We can consider the result by using the same interpretation. In this case,
the cost advantage eect osets the R&D ineciency eect.
As a result, the size of the impact of strengthening patent protection
on rm value depends on the rm's protection strategy and the optimal
protection strategy is aected by the leakage rate.
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Figure 2.6: Protected area and unprotected area in stage-1. Initial patented
parts are regions A, B, and C, and secret parts are regions D, E, and F.
Suppose that the government increases the strength of patent protection
( ! 0). Then, a new monopolist increases the fraction of patented parts
( ! 0). In this case, the additional amount of protected parts is repre-
sented by (B E). Clearly, the amount is relatively high when the initial 
is large.
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Figure 2.7: Growth rate and the openness of the patent system (). The
upper curve \LL" corresponds to the case of ` = 0:02. The middle curve
\LM" is the case of ` = 0:05. The lower curve \LH" is the case of ` = 0:18.
2.4.2 Second case: z1 > 0 and z2 > 0
In this case, unlike the rst case, innovation occurs in sector-1 and  =
A1=(A1+A2) holds. By using this equation and (2.16), we can obtain z2 in
the steady state. After that, from (2.1)-(2.5) and (2.10)-(2.15), we can also
solve z1 in the steady state.
The simulation of this case uses the following parameters: L = 4,  =
1:2,  = 0:03, A = 2, and  = 1=10. As discussed above, when ` is suciently
small the equilibrium of this case can be attained. Therefore, the numerical
analysis uses ` = 0:02, ` = 0:05, and ` = 0:18.
The growth eect is shown in Fig 2.7. A lower  primarily decreases
the growth rate and the result is similar to the Case L in the rst case.
For the same reason in rst case, strong patent protection discourages the
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innovation in sector-2. As represented in Fig 2.8, the curve which shows
the relationship between z2 and  is upward-sloping in three cases. This
negative impact on z2 directly aect the growth rate in this case.
However, the eect of lowering  on z1 is ambiguous. Especially, Panel
(b) and (c) of Fig 2.8 show a weak U-shape relationship between them.
What causes the dierence of the eect on innovation rate between sector-1
and sector-2? To consider this, let us look at Panels (c) and (d) of Fig 2.9.
In sector-2, the R&D ineciency drastically increases by lowering . On
the other hand, the size of the negative impact of the R&D productivity in
sector-1 is relatively small, as shown in the Panel (c). Recall that the addi-
tional amount of protected information becomes small when ` is suciently
low as discussed in Fig 2.6. Although lowering the disclosure requirement
of a patent certainly increases the protected parts per patented part, it also
induces innovators to increase the fraction of patent protection. Because the
latter eect works to oset the former, the R&D ineciency eect is miti-
gated. As a result, the negative impact on the growth rate is also mitigated
by the increase of z1.
In addition, Panels (b) and (c) of Fig 2.8 also show that the sector in
which innovative activity mainly concentrates is dierent between Case LM
and Case LH. In Case LM, many potential rms engage in R&D in sector-
1. When ` is suciently small, the number of sector-1 is relatively large,
which stimulates innovation in sector-1. Conversely, in Case LH, the number
of sector-1 is relatively small, which lowers R&D productivity in sector-1;
therefore, z2 > z1 holds.
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Figure 2.8: Innovation rates (z1 and z2) and the openness of the patent
system (). The upper curve \LL" corresponds to the case of ` = 0:02. The
middle curve \LM" is the case of ` = 0:05. The lower curve \LH" is the
case of ` = 0:18.
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Figure 2.9: Other variables and the openness of the patent system ().
34
2.5 Conclusion
I extended the quality-ladder model of endogenous growth by considering
two IPR protections and a choice problem between them. This model dened
the strength of patent protection as the level of disclosure requirements in
patent applications. The results showed that the growth eect of strength-
ening patent protection may discourage the growth rate.
When the disclosure level of the patent is small, it reduces the common
knowledge because monopolists can conceal a great deal of information in-
volved with the invention through the patent process. This concealment
increases the cost advantage against competitive fringes and enables mo-
nopolists to obtain higher prot. As a result, it stimulates the incentive
to innovate by increasing rm value. However, when innovators cannot use
disclosed information for R&D due to the strong protection, R&D activity
becomes inecient. Therefore, lower common knowledge negatively aects
the R&D productivity, and this eect discourages innovation. In particular,
the latter negative eect is strong when the leakage probability is su-
ciently small, and the growth eect of the policy becomes negative. In other
words, when trade secret is a relatively strong protection strategy for in-
novators, strengthening patent protection is harmful for economic growth.
When the leakage probability is suciently large and monopolists mainly
protect their inventions by patent, strong patent protection conversely en-
hances the growth because the former positive eect is relatively strong.
The results indicated that policy makers have to pay attention to the rel-
ative importance of patent protection for actual rms. In addition, the
relationship between growth rate and patent strength are represented by a
U-shaped curve under a middle leakage probability. This result has been
empirically demonstrated (e.g., Chen and Puttitanun (2005)). In this case,
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policy maker should consider the current amount of disclosure required for
patent protection.
In this chapter, the leakage probability is regarded as an exogenous pa-
rameter. As an extension, we can consider the case where the probability is
endogenously determined. For example, it does not seem very unlikely that
the probability depends on the amount of trade secrets. If a rm has many
trade secrets, it may be dicult for a rm to secure them all. Otherwise,
using the leakage mechanism as a means to spy or reverse engineer an in-
novation can be one way to endogenize the leakage probability. However,
regardless of the extension we consider, the model presented in this chapter
may serve as a starting point for the introduction of two IPR protections in
a DGE model.
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Chapter 3
Legal Enforcement against
Illegal Imitation
3.1 Introduction
In developing countries, many illegal products imitate goods produced in
developed countries, and therefore infringe their IPRs, including patents,
trademarks, and copyrights. Counterfeiting and infringement have tradi-
tionally been regarded as serious problems by foreign companies entering
a market in a developing country because these illegal activities reduce the
sales of the original products. According to a questionnaire survey conducted
by the Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) in 2012,
Japanese rms answer that patent infringements abroad have increased year
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after year, with China being the biggest culprit.1
In China, The Administration of Industry and Commerce (AIC) and
Technical Supervision Bureau (TSB) have the power to investigate an in-
fringement and punish the infringer by imposing a ne and conscating
goods. When foreign companies detect illegal products that infringe their
goods, they can request that the AIC and TSB investigate the infringers.
Because detection and the seizure happens relatively quickly and is not an
expensive operation, many rms rely on the AIC and TSB rather than bring-
ing criminal charges. In addition, the AIC and TSB can conscate illegal
goods independently, without an order from a foreign rm. Recently, this
activity has become more frequent, with the AIC and TSB becoming more
aggressive in their eorts to solve the problem.
However, despite the eorts of the Chinese government institutions, most
Japanese rms still answer that the illegal imitation of their products has
increased. The Japan METI points out that repeat oenses often occur
soon after the rst oence, because the ne is relatively low compared to
earnings, and the guilty parties are able to escape criminal punishment in
several ways.
Many theoretical studies using the North-South model have discussed
the eect of the strength of IPR protection policies in South. For example,
Grossman and Helpman (1993) used an exogenous probability of imitation
as a proxy for the strength of IPR protection. Using an endogenous imi-
tation model, Glass and Saggi (2002) analyzed the eect of the unit cost
of imitation on innovation. However, these models only consider the situ-
ation in which illegal imitation does not occur (or legal enforcement does
not work), and do not pay attention to the enforcement of IPR after an
1Annual Report of Counseling Service against Imitation and Pirate, in Japanese.
(www.meti.go.jp/press/2012/06/20120626005/20120626005-3.pdf)
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infringement. According to these models, when an imitation occurs, the
innovator loses their monopoly forever, because the model does not provide
a way to directly eliminate the infringement. This chapter focuses on how
a government should enforce IPR protection after an infringement occurs.
In related literature, Hori and Morita (2011) studied a similar problem by
using an exogenous seizure rate by the Southern government. An imitation
good is immediately excluded from the market with a constant probability
in each period. In contrast to the typical model, both the Northern followers
(potential rms in North) and Northern leaders (Northern innovators whose
products have been imitated by Southern rms) engage in R&D. They found
that a higher seizure rate always lowers the imitation rate. However, the
eect on the innovation rate is complicated, and the eect on total R&D in-
vestment is unknown. When the seizure rate is suciently strong, a higher
seizure rate increases the level of Northern followers' R&D because it in-
creases their expected prot. However, it sties the Northern leaders' R&D
investment through Arrow's eect. Instead of the growth eect, they ana-
lyzed the welfare eect of the seizure rate, and found that the relationship
between the two is also unclear.
This chapter consists of two analyses. First, in a basic model, I study
the eect of strengthening the seizure rate on imitation, innovation, and
growth rate by extending the work of Grossman and Helpman (1993), which
is quality-ladder-type North-South model. Second, I discuss the economic
impact of an import prohibition on Southern illegal imitations in an extended
model. This chapter has three main results. First, a higher seizure rate does
not always decrease imitative activity in South, as shown in the surveys.
Second, the model shows a U-shaped relationship between innovation and
the strengthening seizure rate. Third, the import prohibition on Southern
illegal imitations necessarily decreases the imitative activities.
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3.2 Basic Model
3.2.1 Setup
The world economy consists of two countries, North (N) and South (S).
There is no population growth and no taris. All households serve their
labor supply inelastically and labor cannot move across the countries. There
are two nal goods: A is the agricultural good and X is the manufacturing
good. Labor is a fundamental input in the production of both goods. The
market for A is perfectly competitive, while that for X is monopolistically
competitive.
3.2.2 Households
All households in N and S have identical preferences. The intertemporal
utility function is such that,
U jt =
Z 1
t
e ( t) lnC1 A;j ()C

X;j()d; (3.1)
lnCX;j() =
Z 1
0
ln
 
~miX
m=0
m(i)xjmt(i)
!
di; (3.2)
where  denotes the discount rate, j = N;S is a country index, and 0 <  <
1 is a share parameter. In the manufacturing sector, the industries continu-
ously exist and the total size is one. The total expenditure in each period is
represented as Ej = PACA;j + PXCX;j , where PA is the price of an agricul-
tural good and PX is the aggregate price index of the manufacturing goods.
The intertemporal utility maximization problem yields each consumption
level under a given expenditure: CX;j = Ej=PX and CA;j = (1 )Ej=PA.
As represented in the equations, all households spend  percent of their
expenditure on manufacturing goods and 1   on agricultural goods.
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Moreover, by solving the instantaneous utility maximization problem,
we can obtain the demand function of each good in manufacturing sector.
xj~mi =
Ej
p ~mi
(3.3)
Clearly, all households purchase only the highest-quality ( ~mi) good in
each industry, i. Therefore, I hereafter omit the subscript ( ~mi) from the
demand and price for simplicity.
Let nN denote the fraction of the industries that Northern rms pro-
duce, and nS be the fraction of the industries that Southern rms produce.
Since the total number of the industries is 1, this leads to nN + nS = 1.
Throughout this section, I assume that all households in the world consume
Southern imitative goods. Then, the composition of the expenditure for
manufacturing goods becomes as follows:
Ej = nNpNx
j
N + nSpSx
j
S (3.4)
Note that, from (3.4), pNx
j
N = pSx
j
S holds. Therefore, nN also represents
the fraction of the expenditure on Northern goods.
3.2.3 Agricultural Goods
All agricultural goods are produced only in South, so Northern households
must import them for the consumption. An agricultural good can be pro-
duced by employing one unit of labor. Since the market is perfectly com-
petitive, the price of good A is equal to the Southern wage rate, wS . By
dening wS as the numeraire, we obtain PA = wS = 1.
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Figure 3.1: The production cycle composition.
3.2.4 Manufacturing Goods
Manufacturing goods are produced in both of North and South. Northern
rms produce their original goods and earn a prot until an imitation or
innovation in the industry occurs. Southern rms produce the imitative
goods that infringe the IPR of the Northern rms, and earn a prot until the
Southern government detects and seizes them. I assume that the production
of one unit of the good requires one unit of labor in both countries.
Southern potential rms engage in imitative activity by employing labor.
As will be shown later, the wage rate in North, wN , is higher than wS = 1
in equilibrium. Since the imitator can charge a price that is lower than the
marginal cost of the Northern rm and they engage in Bertrand compe-
tition, a successful imitator can exclude the Northern rm that developed
the original good by using the limit-pricing strategy. All imitations only
target Northern goods that have not yet been imitated. Southern rms do
not imitate Southern illegal products because the prot will be zero under
Bertrand competition with other Southern rms.
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Northern potential rms devote labor to conducting R&D. All innovation
targets only Northern goods in equilibrium. Innovators' prot when they
innovate a Northern good will be higher than when they innovate a Southern
imitative good because the marginal cost of the old incumbent (wN ) is higher
than the marginal cost of Southern imitators (wS = 1). Therefore, a seizure
is the only way in which Northern rms may recover their monopoly in the
model.
The Southern government seeks domestic illegal products in each period
without any cost. Once Southern imitators are detected by the government,
imitators immediately exit from the market. Then, the Northern rms that
created the original goods regain their monopoly power and once again serve
their products. The conscation activity is exogenous and the probability
of seizure follows a Poisson rate of  2 (0;1). For simplicity, I assume that
imitators are not punished by the government and do not compensate the
Northern rms.
The innovation rate and imitation rate are denoted by zN and zS , re-
spectively. Then, the product cycle in the model can be illustrated as in Fig
3.1. The law of motion for nN and nS can be expressed as follows:
_nN = nS   nNzS and _nS = nNzS   nS: (3.5)
3.2.5 Price and Prot
The nearest rival of a Northern rm is the old Northern leader, and the price
of a Northern good is pN = wN , by limit-pricing. Therefore, the prot of
a Northern rm is N = E(1    1). Here, E  EN + ES represents the
total world expenditure.
I assume that there are competitive fringes in South that can imitate
Southern goods without a research cost and Southern rms face entry pres-
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sure. Competitive fringes can produce a good by employing  > 1 unit of
labor, and wN >  holds in equilibrium. Since they are the nearest rival of
a Southern rm, the price of Southern goods becomes pS = wS as a result
of price competition. The prot of a Southern rm is N = E(1   1).
3.2.6 Asset Market
Let VN denote the rm value of a Northern rm that is not imitated, VNI
the rm value of a Northern rm that is imitated, and VS the rm value of
a Southern rm. The stockholders of these rms can earn a return equal to
the sum of the dividend and the capital gain in each period, while there is a
risk of losing the value with a certain probability. In the equilibrium of the
asset market, the period return of each equity must be same as the return of
other risk-free investments. The no-arbitrage conditions become as follows:
rVN = N + _VN   zS(VN   VNI)  zNVN (3.6)
rVNI = _VNI   (VNI   VN ) (3.7)
rVS = S + _VS   VS (3.8)
3.2.7 Free Entry
I assume that (a=nN )dt units of labor are required to attain zNdt, which is
the probability of a successful innovation in an industry in a short term of
dt. Similarly, a successful imitation in an industry, with probability zSdt,
needs (b=nN )dt units of labor. Here, a and b are parameters that respec-
tively represent the diculty of innovation and imitation, and nN in the
denominator means that innovation and imitation become more eective as
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the number of the targets increases.2
Free entry into innovation implies that the rm value of the Northern
rm, before imitation, is equal to the cost of innovation:
VN =
awN
nN
: (3.9)
Similarly, the free-entry condition of imitation can be written as follows:
VS =
b
nN
: (3.10)
3.2.8 Labor Market
In the North, labor is allocated between innovation and the production of
manufacturing goods. The labor demand must be equal to domestic labor
supply in equilibrium. Therefore, the labor market clearing condition in the
North is:
nN

E
wN

+ azN = LN : (3.11)
In the South, labor is allocated to imitative activity, the production of imi-
tative goods, and the production of agricultural goods, as follows:
nS

E


+ (1  )E + bzS = LS (3.12)
3.2.9 Trade Balance
Finally, I assume that the trade of both countries balances in each period.
(1  )EN + nSEN = nNES (3.13)
2This spillover can be justied by the following interpretation. The discovery of a
target that is suitable for innovation or imitation may take some time and incur a cost.
However, when the number of the targets is large, this becomes easier.
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3.3 Steady State
In the steady state, nN , nS , VN , VNI , VS , EN , and ES are constant over
time. Then, we can obtain the following relationships, which describe the
steady state in the model:
nN =

 + zS
; nS =
zS
 + zS
; (3.14)
VN =
E(1   1)
r + zN + rzS=(r + )
; VS =
E(1   1)
r + 
; (3.15)
and r = : (3.16)
By substituting these equations into the labor market clearing conditions,
we can obtain the imitation rate and innovation rate in the steady state, as
follows:
zS =

LS(1   1)=b  ( 1   1)(r + )


r ( 1 +  1   1) +  1 ; (3.17)
zN = LN (1   1)=a  r

1 +
zS
r + 

: (3.18)
Therefore, the following result holds:
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that LS is suciently large and LS > b(
 1  
1)(r + )(1    1) 1 holds. Then, in the steady state, there is an inverted
U-shape relationship between the imitation rate (zS) and the seizure rate
(). In addition, the imitation rate (zS) is a decreasing function of b and
an increasing function of .
In typical IPR models, b and  are used as proxies for the strength
of IPR protection.3 Interestingly, the imitation rate (zS) and seizure rate
3 is usually used as the level of the patent breadth (e.g., Iwaisako, Tanaka, and
Futagami (2011)).
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() as new proxies exhibit a non-monotonic relationship, while typical IPR
measures have a simple monotonic eect on imitation rate.4
The interpretation of the non-monotonic eect of  is as follows. When
the seizure rate is low, many Southern rms are already imitating Northern
goods. Since the number of the targets is small, the new infringement of
Northern goods is relatively rare. However, if Southern government increases
the seizure rate, imitators lose their job and then try to imitate a dierent
Northern good. This reects the structure of \repeated oenses." When  is
suciently large, seized imitators start to produce agricultural goods rather
than imitate Northern goods because the expected prot becomes very low
if they imitate a dierent good. Therefore, to prevent repeated oenses, the
seizure activity of the Southern government has to be suciently frequent.
In addition, by using the above proposition, we obtain the following
result:
Lemma 3.1. A higher seizure rate necessarily increases (decreases) the
number of Northern (Southern) rms.
Proof. nN can be calculated as follows:
5
nN =

1 +
LS(1   1)=b  ( 1   1)(r + )
r( 1 +  1   1) +  1
 1
(3.19)
This is an increasing function of . Naturally, nS = 1   nN becomes a
decreasing function.
4A small value of b means weak IPR protection of Northern goods in the South, and a
large value of  means strong IPR protection of Southern goods in the South. From the
proposition, we can see that imitation rate is accelerated under a discriminate IPR policy
(b # and  ").
5Surprisingly, in spite of the equation nN = =( + zS), nN is strictly greater than 0
when  = 0 in the steady state. The reason is that nN becomes the indeterminate form
of 0=0 because the imitation rate also goes down to 0, according to  ! 0.
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The increase of  has two eects on nN . First, the more intense seizure
activity directly increases the number of Northern goods because many
Northern rms recover their monopoly. Second, a higher  changes the
level of imitative activity and indirectly aects nN . The indirect eect is
not always negative since a higher value of  may induce repeated oenses.
However, the direct eect always dominates the indirect eect in this model.
Therefore, a higher value of  necessarily increases nN .
Note that both the imitation rate and the number of imitations in each
period, nNz

S , are important. By substituting (3.17) and (3.19) into nNz

S ,
we can calculate the number of imitations in each period as follows:
nNz

S =

LS(1   1)=b  ( 1   1)(r + )


r 1 + LS(1   1)=b+  (3.20)
This is also a non-monotonic function of , as the imitation rate is zS . Then,
we obtain following result.
Proposition 3.2. In the steady state, there is an inverted U-shape relation-
ship between the number of imitations (nNz

S) and the seizure rate ().
The basic intuition is same as Lemma 3.1. From the viewpoint of the
number of imitations, a higher seizure rate may also make many Southern
rms begin to imitate Northern goods again.
Proposition 3.3. The innovation rate (zN ) is non-monotonic function of
the seizure rate (). The maximum values occur at  = 0 and  = , and
the minimum value is attained in the range  2 (0; ).
Proof. By dening ()  zS=(r + ), the innovation rate is rewritten as
follows:
zN = LN (1   1)=a  r (1 + ()) (3.21)
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LN
a (1  1)  r
0
zN


Figure 3.2: An example of the curve of zN .
As shown in Appendix, () is non-monotonic function of , (0) = () = 0
holds, and () > 0 holds for all  2 (0; ). In addition, there is a vertex in
the domain of  2 (0; ).
The innovation rate is high when the imitation rate is low, because a
low risk of imitation stimulates the incentive for innovators. Therefore,
the innovation rate basically exhibits the opposite behavior to that of the
imitation rate.
A higher seizure rate has several dierent eects on the innovation in-
centive. For example, a large  directly stimulates the incentive because the
expected interval of the non-prot term becomes short (direct eect). How-
ever, simultaneously, the imitation rate may be accelerated, which sties
innovation (indirect eect). When the seizure rate is low, the probability
that new imitations occur is low, which raises the innovation rate. However,
when the Southern government then raises the seizure rate, this increases
the imitation rate, and this negative eect dominates the direct eect. Con-
versely, when  is suciently high, the indirect eect becomes positive and
the higher seizure rate stimulates innovation.
The number of innovations per period is also important because the
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growth rate in the model is determined by the expected time of improvement
of quality at an instantaneous moment in time. The growth rate, g, can be
calculated as follows:
g = nNz

N ln
=

LN
a
(1   1)  r

(1 + ())



1 +
LS(1   1)=b  ( 1   1)(r + )
r( 1 +  1   1) +  1
 1
ln (3.22)
We can see that the growth rate is an increasing function of b, a typical
measure of the strength of IPR protection, because a higher value of b raises
both nN and z

N . Although the central motivation is to analyze the growth
eect of the seizure rate (), the above functional form is dicult to interpret
analytically. Therefore, the next subsection studies the growth eect using
a numerical method.
Finally, I reveal the sucient condition that wN >  always holds for all
 2 (0; ).
Proposition 3.4. Suppose that all parameters satisfy the following condi-
tion:
r

b
   1   ar

> LN >

LS(1   1)  br( 1   1)
br( 1 +  1   1)   1

ar: (3.23)
Then, wN >  always holds for all  2 (0; ).
Proof. See Appendix.
3.3.1 Numerical Analysis
The parameters used to construct Fig 3.3 are LN = 1, LS = 12,  = 1:3,
 = 1:05,  = 0:03, a = 3, b = 2, and  = 0:8. The size of the quality
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improvement, , is also the size of markup. Sener (2006) pointed out that
the markup is estimated to be between 1:05 and 1:4, in several empirical
studies. I have adopted  = 1:3 from within that range. Manseld et al.
(1981) found that the ratio of the imitation cost to the innovation cost is
about 2=3. Nonetheless, the ratio in the model is exible, and changes
according to the Northern wage. Here, I set b = 2 and a = 3. The reason is
that the cost of an illegal imitation is smaller than the cost of an imitation
that does not infringe on the IPR of original products, and therefore 2=3
can be considered an upper bound of the cost ratio. In the model, wN is
always higher than wS = 1. This implies that the maximum cost ratio in
the model is also 2=3 when b = 2 and a = 3. The labor supply of both
countries, LN = 1 and LS = 12, reects the population-ratio between Japan
and China. These parameters satisfy all assumptions of the model.6
The simulation shows that the growth rate exhibits a non-monotonic
relationship with the strengthening enforcement policy ( "). The interpre-
tation is basically the same as for the innovation rate. However, while the
innovation rate attains a maximum value when  = 0, the growth rate is
very low when  = 0. The reason is that the total number of innovations
per period is very small, because the number of innovation targets is low
when  = 0. By increasing the seizure rate from  = 0, although the number
of innovation targets increases, the innovation rate decreases because of the
stimulated imitative activity, and the overall eect on innovation becomes
negative. However, the slope of the growth rate turns upward when  is
suciently large because the policy eect on the innovation rate becomes
positive.
In the model, wN also represents the relative wage between North and
South. Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2011) point out that many quality-
6The assumption in Proposition 3.4 is satised: 1:1973 > LN = 1 > 0:6042.
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wN
g
zS
zN nS
nN
Figure 3.3: Numerical results. Panel (a) shows a non-monotonic relationship
between the seizure rate and innovation rate, as well as imitation rate. Panel
(b) shows the fraction of industries that illegal imitations are produced (nS),
and the fraction of industries that the original products are not imitated yet
(nN ). Panel (c) shows that the Northern wage increases by a higher seizure
rate. Panel (d) shows a U-shape relationship between the economic growth
rate and the seizure rate. This panel indicates that a higher seizure rate
that is larger than a threshold increases the growth rate.
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ladder-type North-South models have diculty explaining actual large wage
dierences between North and South, as shown in empirical studies. How-
ever, the numerical result shown here includes the area in which the relative
wage is larger than the size of quality gap,  = 1:3.
3.4 Extended Model: Import Restriction
Many countries prohibit the import of imitative goods that infringe on the
property rights of domestic rms, and have recently begun to police this
prohibition more vigorously. For example, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA), which aims to prohibit trade of counterfeit goods and
pirated copyright products, was signed in 2011. In fact, it seems that most
illegal products are consumed locally. This section considers the eect of
the import restriction on imitations by extending the previous model.
First, I briey note the main modications to the model. By the import
restriction, Northern households cannot consume Southern imitative goods.
Therefore, their expenditure on manufacturing goods becomes EN = pNx
N
N .
Southern infringers cannot sell their imitations to Northern households, so
their prot naturally decreases. However, Northern rms that are imitated
by Southern infringers can still sell their goods to Northern households at
the price of pN = wN and earn prot NI . Their period prot becomes as
follows:
NI = EN (1   1) and S = ES(1   1) (3.24)
The rm value of imitated Northern rms in the steady state also changes,
as follows:
VNI =
NI + VN
r + 
(3.25)
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By substituting VNI into VN , we can solve for VN in the steady state:
VN =
 [E + zSEN=(r + )] (1   1)
r + zN + rzS=(r + )
(3.26)
The labor market clearing conditions are also rewritten, as follows:
EN
wN
+ nN

ES
wN

+ azN = LN (3.27)
nS

ES


+ (1  )E + bzS = LS (3.28)
Then the trade balance condition becomes:
(1  )EN = nNES : (3.29)
By using the same procedure as in the basic model, we can obtain the
imitation rate in the steady state.
zS =

LS(1   1)=b   1(r + )


r ( 1 +  1   1) +  1 (3.30)
This equation is similar to that of the basic model, and we see that zS again
describes an inverted U-shape curve with . The dierence between zS in
the two models lies in the second term in the bracket in the numerator.
Since   1 <  ( 1   1) holds, the imitation rate in the case of an import
prohibition is lower than in the model that allows imports of imitative goods.
Then, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 3.5. In the steady state, the imitation rate in the case of
an import restriction is necessarily lower than that of the basic model. In
addition, there is an inverted U-shape relationship between the imitation rate
and the seizure rate.
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Intuitively, because of the import restriction, imitative activity becomes
less attractive since it decreases the imitator's prot. Therefore, the labor
demand for imitative activity decreases. Although many workers in South-
ern rms are now released from production, since imitators can now only
sell goods to Southern households, this free labor resource is used in the
production of agricultural goods rather than new imitative activities.
This proposition immediately gives following result:
Corollary 3.1. The import restriction necessarily decreases nNz

S, that is,
the number of new imitations of Northern goods per period.
Proof.
nNz

S =
zS
 + zS
: (3.31)
This is an increasing function of zS .
3.5 Concluding Remarks
The chapter showed that a higher seizure rate may actually stimulate imita-
tive activity in South. When the Southern government increased the seizure
rate, infringers stop producing imitative goods, but then later imitate other
goods. The model suggests an ironic structure of repeat oenses induced
by mild seizure activities. Intensive seizure activities that extirpate illegal
imitations are required to decrease infringements and restore the incentive
for innovation. Paradoxically, the imitation rate is also lowest when the
seizure rate is almost zero in the model. This is because many Southern
imitators already earn a prot by infringing the IPR of Northern goods, so
they do not have an incentive to imitate additional products. Although the
Northern innovation rate also reaches a maximum in this case, the growth
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rate is lower than in the case of intensive seizure activities, as shown in the
numerical example. Therefore, a policy that stops seizure activities is not
necessarily better, even in this case.
I numerically investigated the growth eect of the eliminative activity
of the Southern government and showed that there exists a non-monotonic
relationship. This feature is similar to that in chapter 2. The model in
this chapter also suggests that the strength of the current policy should be
considered by policymakers when deciding on a growth-enhancing regulatory
policy.
Furthermore, as an extension, I introduced an import prohibition policy
as another regulation. This extension to the model showed that import pro-
hibition always has a negative eect on illegal imitations and can stimulate
innovation. Import prohibitions by other countries may be a more direct
method of preventing IPR infringements than domestic seizure activities.
This result indicates that the choice of an eective regulatory policy is also
important to the government.
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A Appendix
A.1 Shape of ()
The section analyzes the functional form of (), which is dened as below.
() 

LS(1   1)=b(r + )  ( 1   1)


r( 1 +  1   1) +  1 : (3.32)
Clearly, () satises that (0) = () = 0 and () > 0 for all  2 (0; ).
The derivative of () is,
 0() =
r( 1 +  1   1) LS(1   1)(r + )  b( 1   1)(r + )2
b(r + )2 [r( 1 +  1   1) +  1]2
 LS(1  
 1)

r( 1 +  1   1) +  1 
b(r + )2 [r( 1 +  1   1) +  1]2
=  LS(1  
 1) 12 + br( 1 +  1   1)( 1   1)(r + )2
b(r + )2 [r( 1 +  1   1) +  1]2
+
r2( 1 +  1   1)LS(1   1)
b(r + )2 [r( 1 +  1   1) +  1]2 : (3.33)
We can see that  0() is a decreasing function on (0; ). Therefore,  0(0) is
larger than  0() for all  2 (0; ).
 0(0) =  b(
 1 +  1   1)( 1   1)r3
br2 [r( 1 +  1   1)]2 +
r2( 1 +  1   1)LS(1   1)
br2 [r( 1 +  1   1)]2
=
LS(1   1)  br( 1   1)
br2( 1 +  1   1) : (3.34)
Next, we consider the position of the vertexes of ().
 0() = 0 , LS(1   1) 12 + br( 1 +  1   1)( 1   1)(r + )2
 r2( 1 +  1   1)LS(1   1) = 0
, A2 +B   C = 0; (3.35)
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whereA  br( 1 +  1   1)( 1   1) + LS(1   1) 1 > 0, B  2br2( 1+
 1 1)( 1 1) > 0, and C  r2( 1+ 1 1) br( 1   1)  LS(1   1) >
0. The solution of the equation is,
 =
 B pB2 + 4AC
2A
: (3.36)
At least one of the solutions is negative. From the existence of , which
attains a maximum of () in  2 (0; ), the other must be in  2 (0; ).
Therefore, () has a unique solution of  in  2 (0; ), which satises
 0() = 0.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.4
Assumption 3.1. All parameters satisfy the following condition:
r

b
   1   ar

> LN >

LS(1   1)  br( 1   1)
br( 1 +  1   1)   1

ar: (3.37)
Here, wN can be rewritten as follows:
wN  	() =

 + r
() + 1 + (ar) 1LN

b
ar(1   1)

: (3.38)
In this case, wN is strictly higher than  when  = 0 because 	(0) =
br

(1   1)(ar + LN )
 1
>  holds from the above assumption. There-
fore, to prove the proposition, it is enough to show that 	() is increasing
function in (0; ). By dierentiating 	(), we have
	0() =
() + 1 + (ar) 1LN| {z }
+
  ( + r)| {z }
+
 0()
(() + 1 + (ar) 1LN )2| {z }
+

b
ar(1   1)

| {z }
+
: (3.39)
Since the denominator is positive, we only have to check that the numerator
is also positive. We already conrmed that  0() is a decreasing function in
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(0; ) and  0(0) is larger than  0(), for all  2 (0; ). Therefore, if 	0(0) >
0 holds, 	() is an increasing function in (0; ), and 	0(0) > 0 can be
calculated as follows:
	0(0) =
1 + (ar) 1LN   r 0(0)
(1 + (ar) 1LN )2
= br

( 1 +  1   1)  1 + (ar) 1LN   LS(1   1)=br   ( 1   1)
 br( 1 +  1   1)(1 + (ar) 1LN )2 1 : (3.40)
From the assumption, the numerator is positive, and so 	0(0) > 0 holds.
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Chapter 4
Southern Innovation and
Foreign Direct Investment
4.1 Introduction
Recently, R&D investment in developing countries has expanded and their
volume of innovation can no longer be ignored. For example, the OECD
(2008a) reports that non-OECD countries increased their share in global
gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) from almost 12% to over 18%
between 1996 and 2005. In China, South Africa, Russia, and India, the ratios
of R&D expenditure to GDP exceed those of high-income countries, such as
Greece and Portugal. From the data supplied by the UNESCO Institute for
Statistics (2009), developing countries accounted for almost 24% of world
GERD and employed almost 38% of world researchers in 2007. Moreover,
the OECD (2008b) reports that R&D expenditure by aliates of U.S. parent
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companies has increased in the Asia (excluding Japan). In the survey of the
United Nations World Investment Report (2005), emerging countries such
as China, India, and Russia were very attractive R&D locations for foreign
companies.
Although these countries seem to have experienced both rising domestic
R&D investment and increasing inward FDI, the relationship between the
two is not clear empirically, and some studies are skeptical about the pure
positive relationship. For example, Falvey et al. (2006) nd that stronger
IPR protection promotes growth in low-income countries. However, they
point out that the growth-enhancing eect stems from the increase in FDI
from advanced countries, and not from increasing domestic R&D investment
and innovation. Similarly, Agosin and Machado (2005) show that the impact
of FDI on domestic investments is ambiguous and emphasize a crowding out
eect by FDI.
Generally, FDI from developed countries takes a number of forms. For
example, consider the case of building production facilities in the host coun-
try, in which case the foreign rm becomes a multinational enterprise (MNE).
From the viewpoint of the domestic rms, this MNE is a foreign entrant with
advanced technologies. According to the FDI spillover literature, this entry
has positive eect on domestic rms. For instance, Caves (1974) tested the
relationship between a domestic rm's productivity and the MNE's employ-
ment share in an industry. He concluded that the MNE has technological
spillovers to domestic rms. On the other hand, some studies point out that
the presence of a strong entrant has a negative eect on domestic rms,
because they lose market share as a result of the competition. For exam-
ple, Aitken and Harrison (1999) nd that FDI has a negative eect on the
productivity of domestic rms through this \market-stealing eect."
Theoretical studies that analyze both FDI and Southern innovation are
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scarce, but recently, some literature has emerged. He and Maskus (2012)
developed a North-South model with FDI and imitation in the South, and
nd that there is a U-shaped relationship between FDI and imitation. Their
model also shows that an FDI-friendly policy that lowers the cost of FDI al-
ways encourages both Southern innovation and FDI. Lorenczik (2012) also
found that lower impediments to FDI necessarily increase Southern inno-
vation through the spillover of FDI. These two studies have a similar set-
ting. They both use the variety expansion model in which FDI accumulates
knowledge capital in the South. In this setup, intense FDI reduces Southern
research costs and stimulates Southern innovation. However, these studies
underestimate the market stealing eect of FDI, which has been identied
in some empirical studies. In the variety expansion model, all goods are im-
perfect substitutes and technologies introduced in the South by FDI do not
drastically exclude old technologies. In addition, even in the quality ladder-
type setup, typical models cannot adequately treat the market-stealing eect
of FDI as long as international trade occurs within the model. For example,
in the model of Glass and Saggi (2002), a Southern rm loses prot after
a Northern innovation occurs in the industry, because Southern households
consume traded Northern goods. To represent the market stealing eect of
FDI, we need to develop an alternative model without international trade.
Innovative goods created by rms in developing countries seem to be
locally consumed. As an example of Southern innovation, He and Maskus
(2012) analyze the history of the Video Compact Disc (VCD). VCD, which
was the rst digital format for storing video on a compact disc, was in-
vented by Wanyan Electronics, a Chinese rm, in 1993. VCD had a higher
picture quality than the Video Home System (VHS), which was widely used
in other countries in the 1990s. However, VCD was not distributed in de-
veloped countries, such as Japan, but only in mainland China and Taiwan.
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Original technologies that emerge in developed countries may not be able
to spread in developing countries because of some fundamental dierences,
such as climate, nationality, laws, infrastructure, and so on. If the technolo-
gies are not received in developing countries, foreign rms who want to enter
the market must re-innovate them. For example, the MNE GE Healthcare,
a U.S. medical equipment company, developed the Vscan (pocket-sized ul-
trasound) in China. In rural areas in China, there are few hospitals and
the trac infrastructure is also poor. Vscan was invented to orient their
medical technologies to the characteristics of the region. In addition, many
DVD players sold in East Asia are backward compatible with VCD, while
almost all of players sold in Japan are not.
The idea is that, in contrast to existing models, if there is no international
trade and technology transfer occurs via MNEs, older Southern technologies
are replaced by the new transferred technologies. In this chapter, to handle
the market-stealing eect of FDI, I incorporate the previous facts into the
quality-ladder model, as follows. Both markets are completely segmented.
Southern innovative goods and products invented by MNEs cannot also be
consumed in the North.1 Although Northern superior technologies cannot
be used in the South at rst, FDI enables this to occur. When technology
transfer by FDI happens, it excludes those Southern rms that create low-
quality goods by perfectly substituting the old technology with the new one.
In this chapter, the model generates a negative relationship between
domestic R&D and FDI, in contrast to previous studies. By the FDI-friendly
policy (lowering FDI cost), FDI is stimulated while Southern innovation is
discouraged, owing to the market stealing eect.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.2, I provide
a new framework based on above discussion. Section 4.3 solves the steady
1In the model, I do not consider the FDI of Southern rms toward North.
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state of the model and section 4.4 analyzes the eect of an FDI-friendly
policy. Finally, section 4.5 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Model
The world consists of two countries, North and South. There is no popula-
tion growth and the labor size is constant over time because all households
serve their labor supply inelastically. In the model, international trade does
not happen, so domestic households consume only domestic goods.2
4.2.1 Households
All households in N and S have same preferences. The intertemporal utility
function is as follows:
U it =
Z 1
t
e ( t) lnCi()d; (4.1)
lnCX;j() =
Z 1
0
ln
0@ ~mjX
m=0
m(i)ximt(j)
1A dj; (4.2)
where  denotes the discount rate and i = N;S is a country index.
The intertemporal utility maximization problem yields _E=E = rt   .
Moreover, by solving the instantaneous utility maximization problem, we
2Instead of the interpretation that there is a fundamental dierence between the coun-
tries, we can consider the case of extremely high trade costs, which means any goods
must be locally produced and consumed. In addition, we can perform the same analysis
under the assumption of intangible local services. Doytch and Uctum (2011) report that
service FDI stock share increased to 49% by 1990 and to 60% by 2002, while the share of
manufacturing FDI has been continuously declining. Perhaps the modeling of services is
more realistic and meaningful than goods.
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Figure 4.1: R&D race
can obtain the demand function of each good.
xi~mi =
Ei
p ~mj
: (4.3)
In the model, Southern expenditure is dened as the numeraire, ES = 1.
4.2.2 R&D Race between North and South
All industries are classied into three states, N, S, and F. In the industry
in state-\N," a northern incumbent produces a high-quality good that is
one-step higher than the Southern state-of-the-art good. He can earn a
prot until new Northern innovation occurs in the industry. At the same
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time, he engages in FDI, which aims to orient his good toward the Southern
market. If the FDI succeeds before he is replaced by a new incumbent, this
industry moves to state-\F." Similarly, in the South, a Southern domestic
monopolist produces the good. Once FDI or Southern innovation happens
in the industry, he is replaced by the MNE or by a new Southern incumbent.
If Southern innovation occurs before FDI, the industry moves to state-\S".
To prevent the case of doubling the quality gap between North and South,
I assume that a technological leader in the South(Southern rm or MNE)
automatically upgrades the quality of the good in one step after Northern
innovation occurs in state-N industries.3
In the industry in state F, the MNE of the Northern incumbent monop-
olistically produces the good for Southern households of the same quality as
the original good. In the South, all Southern potential rms still using the
one-step-behind technology do not have an incentive to innovate because
they cannot earn prot if they succeed with the adaptive innovation. The
industry moves to state-N when a successful innovator emerges in the North.
In the industry in state-S, the Southern rms produce a good of the
same quality as the Northern good. In the same way as state F, the indus-
try moves to state N when Northern innovation occurs. Southern innova-
tors target both state-N industries and these state-S industries. I assume
thatreverse knowledge spillover is very strong and that the Northern leader
can automatically upgrade his own technology by one step when Southern
innovation occurs in the industry in state-S.4
3A similar assumption is used in Aghion and Grith (2005). They allow the case of, at
most, twice the quality gap between the technology frontier and domestic rms. However,
they assume that laggards can automatically upgrade their technology in one step if the
frontier proceeds, which prevents a triple quality gap.
4The example of VCD can be used to justify the assumption. Although Wanyan
invented the VCD in 1993, many foreign rms, such as Sony and Philips, quickly absorbed
the technology and introduced a VCD in the same year. Linden (2003) also stated that
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The total number of industries is unity. I denote the fraction of state-X
industries as nX . Therefore, nN +nS+nF = 1 naturally holds. In addition,
I denote the Northern innovation rate, Southern innovation rate, and FDI
rate as zN , zS , zF , respectively. Then, the instantaneous ow can be written
as follows:
_nN = (nS + nF )zN   nN (zS + zF ) (4.4)
_nS = nNzS   nSzN (4.5)
_nF = nNzF   nF zN : (4.6)
4.2.3 Price and Prot
All rms in both countries have one-to-one production technology. The near-
est rival of a Northern rm is the previous Northern leader, and the price of
Northern goods is pN = wN , by limit-pricing. Therefore, the instantaneous
prot of a Northern rm becomes N = EN (1   1). Similarly, the price
of Southern goods becomes pS = wS as a result of price competition, and
the prot of a Southern rm is S = (1  1). The MNE charges the same
price as the Southern rms. However, they must pay a part of their prot as
costs only imposed on an MNE. I assume that they can only obtain % of
the prot. Then, the prot is F = (1   1). In this chapter,  indicates
the level of FDI-friendly policy in the South, and a higher value of  means
lower FDI impediments.
other companies were quickly able to duplicate Wanyan's product.
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4.2.4 Asset Market
Stockholders earn a return that is the sum of the dividend and the capital
gain in each period, while there is a risk of losing the value, with a certain
probability. In the asset market equilibrium, the period return of each equity
must be same as the return of other risk-free investments.
Let VN denote the rm value of a Northern rm. The instantaneous
prot is N , which it loses with a Poisson rate of zN . Then, the no-arbitrage
conditions become
rVN = N + _VN + zF (VF   VN )  zF cwS   zNVN : (4.7)
The rm value of a Southern rm in a state-S industry and the rm
value of a Southern rm in a state-N industry are denoted as VS and VS0 ,
respectively. In this case, the no-arbitrage conditions become:
rVS = S + _VS   zSVS   zN (VS   VS0); (4.8)
rVS0 = S + _VS0   (zS + zF )VS0 : (4.9)
Likewise, the rm value of a Southern rm in a state-F industry and the
rm value of a Southern rm in a state-N industry are denoted as VF and
VF 0 , respectively. Then, the no-arbitrage conditions become:
rVF = F + _VF   zN (VF   VF 0); (4.10)
rVF 0 = N + F + _VF 0   (zS + zF )VF 0 : (4.11)
4.2.5 Free Entry
I assume that adt units of labor are required to attain zNdt, which is the
probability of a successful Northern innovation in an industry in a short
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term of dt. Similarly, a successful Southern innovation in an industry, with
a probability of zSdt, needs bdt units of labor, and FDI occurs with a prob-
ability of zFdt by employing cdt units of labor. Each parameter represents
the diculty of innovation, imitation, and FDI, respectively. I assume that
c < b. Then the free-entry conditions can be written as follows:
VN  awN (equality holds when zN > 0); (4.12)
VS  bwS (equality holds when zS > 0); (4.13)
and VF   VN  cwS (equality holds when zF > 0): (4.14)
I focus on the case in which Northern innovation, Southern innovation, and
FDI occur simultaneously in equilibrium. If VS < bwS holds in equilib-
rium, Southern innovation does not happen. However, I ignore the case of
inequality to analyze Southern innovation in equilibrium.
4.2.6 Labor Market
In the North, labor is allocated between innovation and the production of
manufacturing goods. The labor demand must be equal to the domestic
labor supply in equilibrium. Therefore, the labor market clearing condition
in the North is:
EN
wN
+ azN = LN : (4.15)
Southern labor is allocated to innovative activity, FDI, and the production
of goods:
1
wS
+ (nN + nS)bzS + nNczF = LS : (4.16)
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4.3 Steady State
In the steady state, nN , nS , VS0 , VF , VF 0 , EN , and ES are constant over
time. Then, we can obtain the following relationships, which describe the
steady state in the model:
nN =
zN
zN + zS + zF
; nS =
zS
zN + zS + zF
; nF =
zF
zN + zS + zF
; (4.17)
VN =
EN (1   1)
r + zN
; (4.18)
VS =
(1   1)(1 + zN=(r + zS + zF ))
r + zN + zS
; (4.19)
VF   VN = (1  
 1)(1 + zN=(r + zS + zF ))
r + zN
; (4.20)
and r = : (4.21)
By substituting these equations into the labor market clearing conditions,
the Northern innovation rate can be solved as follows:
zN = a
 1LN (1   1)  r 1: (4.22)
As shown, the Northern innovation rate is determined only by Northern
parameters, and does not depend on any Southern parameters. In the model,
there is no international trade, the benet of FDI activity is equal to the
cost in equilibrium, and Northern innovation targets all industries. As a
result of this setup, the Northern innovation rate is independent of Southern
characteristics in the model. Although this feature may not be attractive
from the viewpoint of international interaction, it enables us to analyze the
eects of a policy, as Southern individuals take Northern innovation as a
given parameter.
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4.4 The Eect of an FDI-friendly Policy
In this section, I discuss the eect of an FDI-friendly policy ( "). At rst,
to focus only on the case of zS > 0, I impose an upper bound, c=b, on .
4.4.1 The Impact on Southern Innovation
The Southern innovation rate can be solved using (4.13), (4.19), and (4.20).
zS =

c
b
  1

(+ zN ): (4.23)
(4.23) tells us that zS is a decreasing function of . When  increases, the
present value of FDI, (VF  VN ), also increases, since it raises instantaneous
prot. In the asset market, the present value is higher than that of Southern
rms, who can no longer innovate because no one will buy their equity. To
generate a positive Southern innovation rate in equilibrium, the rate must
be decreased using (4.19) because this increases the value of Southern rms.
Then, we obtain the next result.
Proposition 4.1. By FDI-friendly policy ( "), the Southern innovation
rate (zS) necessarily decreases in the steady state.
4.4.2 The Impact on Foreign Direct Investment
By substituting (4.23) into (4.17), we can rewrite (4.16) as
(LM Curve) wS = [ (LS  	(zF ))] 1 ; (4.24)
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where
	(zF )  (nN + nS)bzS + nNczF
=
czNzF + bz

S(z

N + z

S)
zF + (zN + z

S)
:
In addition, by using (4.14), (4.20), and (4.23), we obtain the next rela-
tionship.
(FE Curve) wS =
(1   1) (1 + zN=(+ zS + zF ))
c(+ zN )
: (4.25)
The FDI rate in equilibrium occurs at the intersection of the labor market
contribution (LMC) and the free-entry condition (FEC). As depicted in Fig
4.5, the FEC is a downward sloping curve. The Southern innovation rate is
positive on the curve, but in the upper part of the FEC, cwS > VF   VN
holds, and MNEs decrease the intensity of their FDI. Conversely, MNEs have
innite incentive to invest for FDI in the lower region, because the benet is
strictly higher than the cost. Therefore, to attain the labor market clearing,
the economy must not be in this area.
The slope of 	(zF ) is ambiguous and depends on . As discussed in the
Appendix to this chapter, 	(zF ) becomes a downward sloping curve when 
is suciently small, and there is a lower bound of  that the slope of 	(zF )
can be positive. In the following discussion, we see that the steady state
may not be stable when 	(zF ) is downward sloping.
From here, I analyze how the FDI rate changes when the Southern gov-
ernment becomes more FDI-friendly ( "). First, I clarify the sucient
condition for a unique stable equilibrium to exist in the model.
Proposition 4.2. There exists ~ such that the steady state is always unique
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Figure 4.2: Free-entry condition and FDI rate.
and stable when  is greater than ~ and strictly lower than the upper bound
(~ < c=b).
Proof. See Appendix.
When  is greater than ~, the number of Southern researchers, 	(zF ), is
an increasing function of zF . When there are many Southern researchers, the
wage in equilibrium must increase to sustain the labor market equilibrium.
Therefore, in this case, the relationship between wS and zF is positive. The
curve is described as LME in Fig 4.6. The steady state in the model must be
on the curve. In Fig 4.7, the free-entry condition of FDI is also illustrated as
FEC, which is a downward sloping curve, since VS is a decreasing function
of zF . In the upper part of the FEC curve, the FDI cost is greater than the
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Figure 4.3: The steady state is unique and stable when  is greater than ~.
value and so MNEs decrease the intensity of their FDI. Conversely, in the
lower region of the FEC curve, the benet of FDI is greater than the cost,
in which case MNEs have an incentive to increase their FDI. Therefore, the
steady state is stable in this case.
However, when  is smaller than ~, the number of Southern researchers
becomes a decreasing function of zF . The reason is as follows. The increase
in zF has both a positive eect and negative eect on the number of Southern
researchers. First, the increase in zF directly increases 	(zF ). However, it
also decreases nN and nS , which are the number of industries targeted by
Southern innovation and FDI, respectively. In particular, when  is very
small, zS is very high, and the negative eect on 	(zF ) becomes strong.
In this case, the crowding-out eect by FDI is too strong. Then, the LME
curve becomes downward sloping and the steady state might not be unique
or might disappear, as shown in Fig 4.7. In Fig 4.8, the steady state is
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Figure 4.4: The steady state does not exist, or is not unique when  is
suciently lower than ~.
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Figure 4.5: The steady state may be unstable when  is suciently lower
than ~.
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unique, but not stable. Suppose that initial steady state is E in Fig 4.8,
and the Southern government increases . Then, the two new curves of the
model are LME' and FEC', and the new steady state is E0. However, E0
cannot be attained from E in this case, because the Southern innovators
tend to increase the intensity of FDI in the lower area of FEC'.
To conduct a meaningful discussion, this section focuses only on the case
of ~ < c=b. In this case, we can derive a monotonic relationship between an
FDI-friendly policy and the FDI rate, as follows.5
Proposition 4.3. An FDI-friendly policy ( ") always increases the FDI
rate (zF ) in the steady state.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition states that the relationship between Southern inno-
vation and FDI is substitutionary rather than complementary, because an
FDI-friendly policy always decreases the Southern innovation rate. A sim-
ilar proposition also holds between the instantaneous amount of FDI and
Southern innovation. A numerical example is shown in Fig 4.9.6
Proposition 4.4. An FDI-friendly policy ( ") always increases the amount
of instantaneous FDI and decreases the amount of instantaneous Southern
innovation.
Proof. See Appendix.
The growth rate in both countries is the same, g = (zN + nSz

S) ln.
Then, by the above discussions, we can see that an FDI-friendly policy ( ")
always decreases the growth rate. In the model, Southern innovation can
5Empirically, the relationship between FDI and the restriction is strongly negative
(e.g., Golub (2009)).
6The parameters are LN = 1, LS = 0:2,  = 0:05,  = 1:2, a = 1, b = 1, and c = 0:7.
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Figure 4.6: Numerical example: FDI rate and the amount of instantaneous
FDI. (~ = 0:4667 and c=b = 0:7)
make a relative contribution to growth, in comparison to FDI. The industries
in which FDI occurs take a relatively long time to produce the goods for
Southern households to consume that are one step higher in quality than
the goods produced by the present MNE.
4.4.3 Only FDI Case
When  > c=b holds, there is no Southern innovative activity (zS = 0), and
technology transfer toward the South is in the form of FDI and automatic
upgrades by Northern innovation. In this case, an FDI-friendly policy in-
creases both the FDI rate and the amount of instantaneous FDI. However,
the Southern government cannot increase the growth rate using this policy
because the eect of increasing the FDI rate is oset by the decrease of
the number of state-N industries. In this case, the Southern growth rate is
g = zN ln.
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4.5 Conclusion and Future Perspectives
This chapter showed that Southern innovation can be crowded out by an
FDI-friendly policy because it encourages FDI that has a market stealing
eect. In the model, Southern innovation has more of a growth-enhancing
eect than FDI. Therefore, the Southern government can increase the growth
rate using a regulatory policy against FDI ( #). However, the model also
shows that greater regulation of FDI may cause instability in the economy.
In the model, FDI strongly discourages Southern innovation, and so
the model succeeded in showing the negative relationship between FDI and
Southern innovation. However, in contrast to previous studies, the posi-
tive relationship observed in some empirical studies could not be obtained.
One possible reason is that the setting of the model may excessively un-
derestimate the positive knowledge spillover of FDI. There is a diculty
in expressing knowledge spillover in a quality-ladder model that does not
have knowledge capital. However, in terms of future research, incorporat-
ing a notion similar to knowledge capital into the model may be interesting
extension.
The growth rate in both countries is the same in the model, in spite
of the segmented markets. This feature stems from the assumption of an
automatic upgrade in the R&D race between North and South. If the model
allows at most twice the quality gap, as in Aghion and Grith (2005), the
Southern growth rate is dierent to Northern growth rate, which may be
caused by an FDI policy. This is another possible extension to the current
study.
80
4.6 Appendix
The Southern labor market equilibrium condition is that:
ES
wS
+ (nN + nS)bzS + nNczF = LS : (4.26)
The rst term of the LHS of the above equation is the number of pro-
duction workers, which we can rewrite as follows:
ES
wS
=
c
(  1)

+
zN (z

S + zF )
+ zN + z

S + zF

(4.27)
  (zF ): (4.28)
Here,  (zF ) is an increasing function of zF and z

S . Since z

S is a decreasing
function of ,  (zF ) necessarily decreases by  ".
The sum of the second term and the third term of the LHS represents the
number of researchers in Southern rms and MNEs. The number researchers
can be also rewritten as the function of zF .
(nN + nS)bzS + nNczF =
czNzF + bz

S(z

N + z

S)
zF + (zN + z

S)
(4.29)
 	(zF ): (4.30)
Here, 	(zF ) is a linear fractional function. Therefore, if the discriminant,
D, is negative, 	(zF ) is an increasing function of zF . We can then calculate
the discriminant as follows:
D = bzS(z

N + z

S)  czN (zN + zS)
= (zN + z

S)(bz

S   czN )
= (zN + z

S)

c

  b

+ zN

c

1

  1

  b

D < 0 ,  > ~  c (+ z

N )
b
 
+ zN

+ czN
<
c
b
: (4.31)
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Then, 	(zF ) is an increasing function of zF in the range [~; c=b]. Next, I
prove that 	(zF ) is a decreasing function of z

S .
@	
@zS
=
bzS
2 + 2bzS(z

N + zF ) + bz

N
2 + (b  c)zNzF
(zS + z

N + z

F )
2
> 0: (4.32)
Therefore, an FDI-friendly policy ( ") always decreases  (zF ) + 	(zF )
directly, and indirectly through the change in zS . To restore equilibrium in
the labor market, zF must increase, because  (zF ) +	(zF ) is an increasing
function in the case of  2 [~; c=b].
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This dissertation discussed innovation, imitation, foreign direct investment,
regulatory policies, and economic growth using several growth models. In
all chapters, the analyses were done theoretically, using both analytical pro-
cedures and numerical methods.
In chapter 2, I analyzed the growth eect of strengthening patent protec-
tion. The chapter shows that stronger patent protection may hinder growth
when the leakage risk of trade secrets is relatively small. This result suggests
that a strong patent policy regulation is unnecessary when the patent is not
as attractive a protection method as the trade secret. In particular, there
is a U-shaped relationship between growth and the strength of patent pro-
tection in the case of a middle-level risk. This non-monotonic relationship
means that the present strength of the regulatory policy is important when
policymakers come to decide on change to the regulations.
Chapter 3 investigates why illegal imitative activities in developing coun-
tries do not necessarily disappear, even when the government increases the
intensity of seizures. However strong the IPR protection, infringements of
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IPR cannot be prevented without strong enforcement by the government.
This chapter focused on regulatory policies, such as the strict enforcement
of the law. The model showed that, when the initial seizure rate is small,
a drastic increase in the seizure rate is required to exterminate illegal im-
itation. In this case, a mild increase in seizure activities stimulates the
incentive to infringe on other products, and just makes the situation worse.
This result suggests that the strength of the current regulation is key to
encouraging innovation by discouraging illegal imitation, in the same way
as chapter 2. As an extension, I also discussed the impact of an import
prohibition policy. The model shows that import prohibition always has a
negative eect on illegal imitations, and can stimulate innovation. Import
prohibition by other countries may be a more direct method of preventing
infringements than domestic seizure activity. This result indicates that the
choice of regulatory policy that will be more eective is also important to
the government.
In chapter 4, I discussed the relationship between Southern innovation
and FDI. The chapter showed that Southern innovation can be crowded out
by an FDI-friendly policy, as it encourages FDI that has a market stealing
eect. In the model, Southern innovation has a growth-enhancing eect,
in contrast to FDI. Therefore, the Southern government can increase the
growth rate by using a regulatory policy against FDI ( #). However, the
model also shows that greater regulation of FDI may cause instability in
the economy. In the model, FDI strongly discourages Southern innovation.
Therefore, while the model succeeded in showing a negative relationship be-
tween FDI and Southern innovation, it was not able to show the positive
relationship observed in some empirical studies. One possible reason is that
the setting of the model may excessively underestimate the positive knowl-
edge spillover of FDI. There is a diculty in expressing knowledge spillover
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in a quality-ladder model that does not have knowledge capital. However, in
terms of future research, incorporating a notion similar to knowledge capital
into the model may be interesting extension.
In some chapters, we found that, under some circumstances, regulatory
policies may discourage innovative activities and decrease the growth rate.
Almost all the models in this dissertation suggest that there is no ideal
policy that can stimulate innovation and increase economic growth in all
situations. The dissertation addressed the latest topics in intellectual prop-
erty rights and research activities around the world. Of course, the world
economy is constantly changing, so we cannot forecast when the subject of
a dissertation might become obsolete. Nevertheless, the models in this dis-
sertation provide a starting point for the discussion of regulatory policies.
This dissertation mainly analyzes the growth eect of regulatory policies.
However, these policies have other goals, which need to be analyzed as well,
including welfare, wage dierences. These topics are all possible areas of
future research.
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